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Introduction
 In Freedom House’s annual press 
freedom scores, Malaysia has been labeled 
“Not Free” every year since 1994. It has 
performed particularly poorly in the “Political 
Environment” category, explained by the 
61-year electoral dominance of the Barisan 
Nasional (BN) coalition following independence 
in 1957 (Freedom House, 2017a). Weak press 
freedom and a stalled political environment 
discouraged government criticism by news 
outlets. Nonetheless, Malaysian journalists 
have, more recently, been able to circumvent 
this situation using technology. The fast 
spread of Internet connectivity, followed by 
smartphone and social media usage, has given 
Malaysians enhanced distribution channels for 
information. Therefore, Malaysia’s freedom 
on the net is substantially higher than its 
overall press freedom, being considered partly 
free since 2009 (Freedom House, 2017b). 
These digital frontiers swarmed with anti-
government opinion after the exposure of 
the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) 
scandal, a multinational operation that 
siphoned about $4.5 billion from a Malaysian 
public development fund into the pockets of 
Prime Minister Najib Razak and associates. 
Leading up to Malaysia’s fourteenth general 
election (GE14) in 2018, these alternate media 
conditions culminated in a victory against 
Najib and BN, signaling a freer, more effective 
Malaysian press.
 The story of media consumption in 
Malaysia reflects an escalation of accountability 
among those in power—over time, the media 
landscape changed as new platforms led to 
greater information spread. Put simply, as 
Malaysian media advanced technologically, 
there was more room for political dissent. 
At the start, traditional media, such as daily 
newspapers and cable television, dominated 
the news cycle and were almost exclusively 
run by United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), the largest member party of BN. 
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Before anything was printed or aired, there 
was ample time and procedure in place to 
make sure no anti-government news would 
be shown. Around the time of GE12 in 2008, 
independent media had its first chance to 
compete for the attention of Malaysians. Blogs 
and other independent online news sites 
complicated, but did not destroy, the monopoly 
of state-run media. To combat its lost territory, 
BN strategically limited press freedom through 
tactics such as sedition lawsuits, while carefully 
conserving a notion of press freedom ahead of 
GE13 in 2013. Media development did not stop 
at simple digital platforms; the development 
of widespread social media reached Malaysia 
as Internet penetration increased. After GE13 
showed a surprisingly close result that stripped 
BN of its popular vote majority, it became clear 
that BN might truly be challenged in GE14 in 
2018, emboldening the Najib-led ruling party 
just as much as it did its opposition. As BN took 
extreme measures to ensure victory, it peeled 
back the illusion of press freedom, cracking 
down in an unprecedented manner. That 
crackdown backfired because the Malaysian 
media landscape had become dominated by 
WhatsApp, a notably encrypted messaging 
app, which Malaysians used without fear. Viral 
discussion on WhatsApp of the 1MDB scandal, 
with Najib at its center, was the climax, and 
there was nothing he could do to control it. 
The reach of information allowed Malaysians 
to take control of their democracy and oust BN 
in GE14, ending the reign of a historically anti-
press government.
Barisan Nasional’s Hold on 
Traditional Media
 Before the advent of the Internet, Malaysia 
relied on two government-controlled channels 
to receive its news: cable television and print 
newspapers. Both run on a regimented 24-hour 
cycle, making it simple to set up procedures 
to censor content. Hata Wahari, the former 
president of the National Union of Journalists 
Malaysia (NUJ), exposed UMNO’s routine of 
media control after he was fired from the 
longtime UMNO-controlled newspaper Utusan 
Malaysia in 2011. When asked about political 
influence, he said, “As a journalist with Utusan 
for 16 years, I know that instructions are 
given every afternoon” (Reporters, “Fired…”). 
Daily publications, such as The Star, New 
Straits Times, and Berita Harian, all of which 
are known to be friendly with BN (Sulong), 
operated similarly. This news protocol let the 
government dictate what news was reported 
and exactly when the news would appear. 
Eventually, the media landscape evolved, and 
as 2008’s GE12 approached, mainstream pro-
government news began to falter. The New 
Straits Times, the country’s oldest newspaper 
still in print, had its average daily circulation 
fall nearly every year from 1993 to 2007, 
resulting in an approximate 22% overall 
decrease (Media…). During the same time, 
Malaysia’s population rose 37%.
 Traditional forms of media lost popularity 
as the digital world expanded, making the 
Internet a more attractive news source. From 
2000 to 2010, Internet penetration shot up 
from 21.4% to 56.3% (United…). The media 
mix consumed by the average Malaysian 
swayed toward new media because of the need 
to search for additional information on subjects 
about which traditional media refused to 
elaborate (Alivi et al., p. 19). Founded in 1999, 
Malaysiakini, the country’s most prominent 
independent news site, was receiving 3 million 
monthly page views by 2007 (Kenyon and 
Marjoribanks, p. 110). Technological growth 
was not the only factor in this shift, though. 
The political status quo was evolving in ways 
that threatened the government, which 
responded by limiting the press, making 
traditional news sources less trustworthy and 
even less attractive to Malaysians. 
 Starting in 2007, in a GE12 environment 
that yielded an opposition’s first concrete 
attempt to gain ground on BN, the state overtly 
exercised its power to limit the opposition. That 
year, Malaysiakini released an obtained copy of a 
letter from the Malaysian Communications and 
Multimedia Commission (MCMC) that ordered 
all private television stations not to broadcast 
opposition speeches (“Opposition…”). The 
political pressures BN faced, and its choice 
to clamp down on them, were reflected in 
Malaysia’s score in the Press Freedom Index 
by Reporters Without Borders. Malaysia’s 
world rank in the index, which was an average 
of 106th from 2002 to 2006, has dropped to 
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138th from 2007 to present (Reporters, Press 
Freedom Index). One disturbing trend in BN’s 
behavior around 2007 was its willingness to 
retaliate against and, in some cases, harass 
the independent press. Until that point, most 
of the upfront censorship consisted of nudging 
mainstream media away from anti-government 
topics. But after independent digital journalism 
gained popularity, Science, Technology, and 
Innovation Minister Kong Cho Ha signaled in 
2006 that legislation needed to be introduced 
to silence bloggers, who were “disseminating 
disharmony, chaos, seditious material and lies” 
(Reporters, “Government…”). Two years later, 
the MCMC ordered major Internet service 
providers to block access to one of Malaysia’s 
most prominent independent news websites, 
Malaysia Today, under the Communications 
and Multimedia Act, citing “national interest” 
(Reporters, “Authorities…”). Again, BN did its 
best to vehemently discourage journalists from 
presenting alternate viewpoints.
 Simultaneously, the digital realm was 
leveraged for government support. It was harder 
for the government to respond to and suppress 
criticism online, but it ultimately held certain 
advantages online from its organized position 
and size. In terms of the business model for 
digital news, ad revenue and multi-channel 
dissemination of information are requirements 
to successfully capture an audience. These 
necessities come easiest to established news 
giants and conglomerate groups, which have 
the name value and reach to fit a genuinely 
24/7 business model. The Malaysian media 
giants that owned the BN-friendly newspapers, 
such as The Star, New Straits Times, and 
Berita Harian, stepped into the digital age 
by consolidating through mergers and 
acquisitions (Tapsell, “New…”). Their head 
start occurred while independent media 
entities had trouble just getting started trying 
to reach readers at the same pace. Malaysiakini 
has been twice denied a printing license, 
striving for the same multichannel positioning 
as other media groups, even after winning a 
landmark freedom of expression case on the 
matter (“Despite…”). In one sense new digital 
developments had increased transparency in 
a media environment that needed it, but the 
system was still rigged. At the same time, a 
slim win by BN in GE12, without a two-thirds 
majority for the first time since 1969, signaled 
forward progress.
Spreading Dissent via Social Media 
 In 2008, Malaysia had 800,000 Facebook 
and 3,429 Twitter users. By 2013, 13.2 
million Malaysians were on Facebook and 2 
million on Twitter (Gomez, p. 96). GE13, like 
GE12, had introduced a new electoral media 
environment. This change came at a time 
when the opposition had gained momentum, 
promising an even more competitive race. But 
BN was ready to counter the opposing views 
shared on social media by getting tougher 
on journalists. Instead of just threatening 
reporters and implying legal trouble, it 
started to take concrete action against them. 
Authorities held a blogger in jail in 2012 under 
the Official Secrets Act, attempting to turn a 
simple defamation case into a matter of state 
security (Reporters, “Blogger…”). Social media 
presented a unique challenge to government 
censorship, and BN’s fear of how quickly 
opposition voices could now spread showed in 
its actions.
 However, BN found ways to score its own 
political points using social media’s reach by 
leveraging its established size and budget, as 
it had done with new media. In the first half 
of 2013, BN’s advertising expenditure, which 
included online election advertising for the 
first time, totaled an unusually high $162 
million. This spike was driven by Najib’s office, 
which multiplied its spending fivefold from the 
previous year. By April 2013, BN’s investment 
in social media proved successful; Najib had 
1.46 million Twitter followers, with opposition 
leader Anwar Ibrahim well behind at 267,000 
(Gomez, pp. 99–100). It was a matter of 
organization: the opposition’s momentum was 
distributed compared to BN’s concentration on 
making Najib its unified figurehead.
 Najib’s strong brand was also enhanced 
through traditionally controlled news, 
including the New Strait Times, which 
promoted his promise to increase cash 
handouts. Ahead of GE13, Najib handed out an 
estimated RM11 billion ($3.6 billion) over the 
course of an 18-month scheme (Grant). The 
multichannel success BN was enjoying from 
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prominent social media to complimentary 
legacy publications starkly contrasted the 
struggles of government-harassed independent 
news sites. To avoid looking anti-democratic, 
BN adopted a similar handout strategy to 
pacify press freedom complaints. BN amended 
the Printing Presses and Publications Act and 
cut the Internal Security Act, entirely (Tapsell, 
“New…”). These concrete steps appeared 
substantial because the relevant legislation had 
forced publications to hush anti-government 
rhetoric. However, when BN moved harshly 
back toward censorship after narrowly winning 
GE13, it was clear its purpose had been to gain 
votes. 
 On February 25, 2015, Sarawak Report, 
a niche news site founded by independent 
British journalist Clare Rewcastle Brown, 
released a bombshell piece entitled “HEIST 
OF THE CENTURY - How Jho Low Used 
PetroSaudi as ‘A Front’ To Siphon Billions 
Out of 1MDB!” This release started Rewcastle 
Brown’s journey to uncover a scandal in 
which billions of dollars were elaborately 
funneled through a national company, whose 
mission was supposed to be strategic economic 
development, into investments diverted to 
Najib and his associates. The accusation was a 
direct attack on Najib, who was alleged to have 
personally received $681 million (Rewcastle 
Brown, The Sarawak…, p. 279). The 
government-controlled media largely refused 
to report on the 1MDB scandal, and those that 
did were met with a slew of attacks designed 
to discourage investigation. Three editors from 
Malaysian Insider were arrested for alleged 
sedition in March 2015 after pursuing the 
story. Even Rewcastle Brown, who is based in 
London and has familial connections to former 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, was 
targeted. In order to continue pursuing the 
story, she withstood repeated cyber-attacks 
on her website, smear campaigns run against 
her by hired Malaysian media groups, and 
even an arrest warrant (Rewcastle Brown, The 
Sarawak…, p. 319). Now recognized as one 
of the largest international financial scandals 
in modern times, 1MDB signified a turning 
point for Malaysian media. The government’s 
intentions to control the media in relation to 
the scandal were put on display.
 With the intensity of an even more 
competitive GE14 approaching and the 1MDB 
scandal threatening his popularity, Najib was 
no longer prepared to give the illusion of a free 
press. He attacked digital freedoms using his 
vast social media following, lobbying public 
opinion with calls for “information from 
legitimate sources and not third-party news 
portals or online blogs that might have hidden 
agendas” (Rewcastle Brown, The Sarawak…, p. 
225). Furthermore, in May 2017, a year before 
GE14, the MCMC launched Sebenarnya.my, 
a portal for Malaysian citizens to report 
falsehoods and check clarifications to combat 
false news. In just 6 months, the site received 
over 15 million hits (“MCMC’s…”). Non-
political clarifications were most common, 
but some announcements made closer to 
GE14 read more like propaganda, for instance, 
“Beware of False Information Dissemination 
by GE-14.” In addition, BN made its greatest 
threat to press freedom by fast-tracking an 
anti–fake news bill into law in April 2018. The 
law’s broad definition and harsh punishment of 
up to 6 years jail time and/or a maximum fine 
of RM500,000 ($129,500) was a clear attack 
on the media (Tapsell, “The Smartphone…,” 
p. 23). Less than a week before GE14, BN 
weaponized the law to investigate opposition 
rival Dr. Mahathir Mohamad regarding his 
publicly stated suspicion that someone had 
sabotaged a private plane he was meant to take 
(Ananthalakshmi and Latiff). The public took 
note of this effort and the general appearance 
that the closer GE14 approached, the more 
desperate BN became. 
WhatsApp’s Prevalence in  
Political Discussion 
 A major way Malaysians discussed their 
opinions on GE14 issues such as 1MDB was 
through smartphones. Digital communication 
in Malaysia has ballooned beyond the urban 
hubs of Kuala Lumpur and Penang because 
Internet access via smartphone has reached 
many rural areas. The percentage of adults with 
Internet access in urban areas stayed stagnant 
from 2012 to 2017. The same measure grew 
from 24.2% to 57% for rural counterparts. 
In 2018, the MCMC reported that around 
90% of Malaysian Internet users were using 
51
a smartphone (Tapsell, “The Smartphone…,” 
pp. 12–13). WhatsApp, specifically, has 
become a key facet of everyday life in Malaysia 
for communication with friends, family, 
coworkers, and businesses. Most importantly, 
WhatsApp has become an arena for digital 
news. Of all researched countries in the 
2018 Reuters Institute Digital News Report, 
Malaysians showed the highest percentage of 
news consumption on WhatsApp in a given 
week at 54% participation, with Brazil next 
at 47%. Both countries, along with others 
whose citizens frequent WhatsApp for news, 
have something else in common: expressing 
political views online could lead to trouble with 
their authorities. The Reuters report explained 
this correlation by noting the encryption 
WhatsApp secures its messages with provides 
a place for safe political expression. With little 
faith in news overall, ranked 34th out of 37 
countries by Reuters, Malaysians have been 
looking for entirely new media formats (Nic 
et al., pp. 11–13, 16). That is why WhatsApp 
public groups are so important. Although 
it was never the intention of the app, public 
groups have been used, at times, to establish 
independent “newsrooms.” A WhatsApp public 
group is a messaging channel that anyone can 
join,1 as opposed to invite-only private groups 
that are typically created for friends or family. 
Public groups are communities for discussion, 
including ones that focus on politics. 
 To appreciate the impact of political 
WhatsApp public groups on the news cycle, 
it is important to understand how political 
conversations play out in these groups. A 
technical paper published by social computing 
researcher Josemar Caetano and colleagues 
in 2018 provided a breakthrough on this 
topic by characterizing 270,000 messages and 
7,000 users in WhatsApp public groups, some 
politically focused and some not. This research 
is relevant to Malaysia’s media environment 
because it was done in Brazil, a country whose 
citizens also say they cannot trust traditional 
channels and have an extremely high adoption 
of WhatsApp for news. The results depict an 
interesting system in which political WhatsApp 
groups appear substantially different from non-
political groups. By statistically classifying the 
 1Up to 256 members.
messages into groups labeled “sessions,” the 
researchers found sessions in political groups 
have more messages, more participating 
users, and longer durations compared to non-
political ones. This disparity is reflected in the 
average amount of time between messages: 
2.8 minutes for political versus 12.4 minutes 
for non-political. Despite the clear evidence 
for greater engagement in political groups, 
looking closer at the data shows that the greater 
activity is concentrated among the few most 
engaged members (Caetano et al.). The most 
active users moderate discussions, with passive 
users only chiming in when a relevant topic 
prompts their expertise or opinions. Caetano 
and colleagues liken the collaborative format 
to talk shows, with hosts and an audience, 
which have sprung up organically in response 
to unreliable facilitation of news on real TV. 
 As Brazilian citizens have turned 
to WhatsApp to supplement a similarly 
restrictive media environment, the conditions 
surrounding Malaysia’s GE14, labeled a 
“WhatsApp election” (Tan, “It’s…”), suggest it 
was influenced by WhatsApp communication, 
including similar political talk shows. Ross 
Tapsell, an expert on Southeast Asian media, 
who researched on and lurked in WhatsApp 
public groups ahead of GE14, confirmed 
that political operatives were aware of how 
important WhatsApp groups were to swaying 
public opinion. UMNO, for instance, through 
its IT Bureau, created infrastructure via 
WhatsApp to disseminate information from the 
state level down to village levels and grassroots 
communities. Tun Faisal, Chairman of the 
UMNO Youth New Media Unit, said, “Previously 
we relied on blogs and Facebook, now the 
communication infrastructure of WhatsApp is 
core business” (Tapsell, “The Smartphone…,” 
p. 16). Tapsell also shared findings on what 
ordinary Malaysians chose to discuss as topics 
of rumor and conversation. Of course, 1MDB 
was central to debate. As awareness spread of 
the aggressive tactics deployed by BN to keep 
the scandal covered up, those tactics started 
to backfire. Angry, skeptical Malaysians were 
not pacified by government handouts this 
time. Focused on the country’s financials, 
some users Tapsell observed believed that 
government funds, such as those raised by the 
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vastly unpopular goods and services tax (GST), 
were being used to pay back bonds 1MDB had 
borrowed to finance the bogus “investments” of 
the company. Others suspected the GST helped 
fund Najib’s wife Rosmah’s shopping sprees. 
BN could not contain the viral nature of such 
accusations. An anonymous government social 
media campaigner told Tapsell that trying 
to deny them “just leads to more negative 
comments, so we stopped trying” (Tapsell, “The 
Smartphone…,” p. 19). Thanks to WhatsApp, 
it was a popular opinion among everyday 
Malaysians that they were being stolen from and 
silenced, and they were prepared to act. BN was 
ousted in the election by a convincing margin, 
reinforcing that this “WhatsApp election” had 
altered Malaysia’s electoral paradigm.
Analysis of a Post-GE14  
Media Environment
 When visiting shortly after the election, 
I asked locals, ranging from regular citizens 
to think tank researchers, about the future of 
Malaysia’s media. It was hesitantly suggested 
to me that legacy government-controlled 
publications might increase their legitimacy 
because of Mahathir’s campaign promise to 
repeal a number of repressive media laws 
(Tan, “Dr M…”). Less than 2 weeks after being 
elected, Mahathir seemed to change his mind. 
He was condemned by Reporters Without 
Borders after he publicly said the Anti-Fake 
News Act would not be scrapped entirely, but 
instead amended. All things, he said, including 
the press, had a limit to their freedoms 
(Deloire). Eventually, Mahathir and Pakatan 
Harapan (PH) did follow through in August 
to start the repeal process in the House of 
Representatives. However, the Senate, in 
which disgruntled members of BN still own 
the majority, voted 28-21 to reject the repeal, 
saying the bill needed amending not removal 
(Venkiteswaran). As of now, the law stands, 
although the attempted repeal should signal 
the current administration has no intention to 
enforce it. It also remains to be seen whether 
PH is serious about fulfilling its promises to 
repeal the remaining acts, which may not have 
made headlines like the Anti-Fake News Act 
but have caused greater harm in the history 
of Malaysian media. Even in a post-BN era, 
progress is clearly slow.
 With long-term decline and bureaucratic 
amendment processes, traditional media may 
be running out of time to regain legitimacy. 
Malaysians have begun to ignore mainstream 
media, only trusting the news 30% of the 
time. Even TV3, the free-to-air channel that 
almost half of Malaysians tune into in a given 
week, has the lowest brand trust among 
viewers compared to other top news sources. 
Yahoo! News is currently the country’s most 
trusted news brand, and Malaysiakini leads 
all competition as 44% of Malaysians use it 
weekly (Nic et al., pp. 131–32). Additionally, 
according to digital traffic rankings from web 
analytics compiler Alexa, The Star Online 
is the only traditional news site in the top 
50. Malaysiakini, along with social and blog 
sites like YouTube, Facebook, Blogspot, and 
WordPress, ranks well ahead (“Top…”). While 
they serve many purposes other than news, 
these sites have clearly captured a great market 
share of digital users; 72% of Malaysians use 
social media as a source for news compared to 
57% for TV and 41% for print publications (Nic 
et al., p. 132). These figures suggest a possible 
future without the need for mainstream media 
even if it does repair trust.
 At the same time, there is some truth 
to what the Anti-Fake News Act stated as 
its goal. There has been a worldwide rise in 
misinformation because of how easy it is to 
share eye-catching news on social media. A 
2017 study found false news is 70% more likely 
to be reshared on Twitter (Vosoughi et al., p. 
1149), which, like Facebook and YouTube, 
algorithmically displays content based partly 
on how much engagement it gets. Malaysia’s 
news distribution environment is headed 
in a slightly different direction because, in 
addition to those platforms, it depends highly 
on WhatsApp, which has historically chosen 
not to filter and order content. Yet, if false 
content is being shared in WhatsApp chats, 
the consequences remain. To fix the root of the 
problem, Malaysia will need a dependable set of 
outlets, mainstream or independent, that can 
be trusted as content is distributed through 
WhatsApp. In order to do its part to achieve 
this, the government’s first and foremost goal 
must be to convince its citizens that the press 
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can operate free from state influence, without 
fear of retaliation. This will never happen 
until the antiquated legislation that threatens 
journalists and publications is removed. In 
the history of Malaysian media, reporters 
have been targeted at every step because these 
policies were used as ammunition. If PH wants 
to represent prosperity for Malaysians, it needs 
to fulfill its campaign promises to repeal these 
problematic laws—from the Anti-Fake News 
Act to the Sedition Act. 
 Malaysian journalists and broadcasters 
must also take the brave step forward of 
demanding their freedom to report the truth. 
This should consist of not only asking important 
questions and scrutinizing government 
positions while reporting but also challenging 
structure and policy. A joint statement from 
a united set of journalist groups exemplified 
this mission, proposing the formation of a 
Malaysian Media Council Journalists Alliance 
to represent Malaysian journalists. The 
message responded to the stated intention of 
the government to set up a Malaysian media 
council without consulting journalists or the 
public. The statement added, “We also believe 
that any effort towards the creation of a media 
council will be futile if it’s not in tandem 
with the repeal and/or amendment of certain 
repressive laws such as the Printing Presses 
and Publications Act 1984” (“Journalists’…”). 
This statement is a prototype of how the press 
itself can do its part. In conjunction with 
governmental action, journalists’ exertion of 
power gives Malaysia a chance to legitimize its 
mainstream media. 
 Alternatively, trust might be put in the 
social platforms themselves, which have been 
under increased scrutiny to take responsibility 
for the role they have played in spreading 
misinformation. WhatsApp responded by 
debuting a fact-checking service in April 
2019, implemented in time for voters to verify 
discourse by sending in tips leading up to India’s 
national elections. Despite this representing a 
first attempt by WhatsApp, and by no means a 
committed long-term solution, the company 
said it would also be populating a database of 
the rumors to learn from the data set going 
forward (Ravikumar). By completion of the 
month-long election in the world’s biggest 
WhatsApp market by volume, the company 
had received 75,000 verification requests 
and was seeing trends in duplicate or related 
claims (Chaturveti). This attempt proves that 
in addition to governmental policy, WhatsApp 
and other social media companies will have a 
big stake in how democracy plays out in future 
Malaysian elections. 
Conclusion
 After decades of a familiar pattern in 
which Malaysia’s ruling government suppressed 
journalists and exercised control over media 
channels, new technologies have disrupted the 
status quo. At each step in the changing media 
environment, BN took advantage of its money 
and/or stature to combat the chance that 
innovation would give a voice to dissenters. 
When the country’s Internet penetration 
spiked ahead of GE12, opening up room for 
independent platforms, government-owned 
publications consolidated through mergers 
and acquisitions to outsize competitors in the 
digital arena. When Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube became the dominant media ahead 
of GE13, the government’s advertising budget 
funded a concentrated push to increase Najib’s 
Twitter base. And when WhatsApp finally gave 
Malaysians a place to safely discuss politics 
ahead of GE14, new legislation was introduced 
that threatened to jail those who shared 
arbitrarily assessed misinformation. Although 
the tactics changed over time, it was always 
about preventing the spread of information. 
Now, with a new government for the first time 
in 61 years, Malaysia can finally ask itself how 
it may repair its broken media environment. 
 What trajectory should Malaysia take 
to ensure the health and freedom of its 
press—including legacy publications, newer 
independent sites, personal blogs, and social 
platforms—at this turning point in its history? 
Currently, Malaysia has a weak mainstream 
media but a strong independent media that 
has leveraged WhatsApp to keep the public 
informed without becoming part of the 
mainstream. In Malaysia’s alternate media 
environment, WhatsApp provides superior 
distribution channels because its encrypted 
messages allow people to speak freely about 
political issues without any interference or 
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surveillance. With these conditions, especially 
after a miraculous democratic victory by PH, it 
is worth considering whether Malaysia should 
bother to prioritize centralized, mainstream 
media, including outlets that have been used 
as a tool of corruption for so long. Regardless 
of what direction is pursued, it is of vital 
importance to abandon the oppressive Anti-
Fake News, Sedition, and Printing Presses and 
Publications Acts. These potential legislative 
steps, in conjunction with further investment 
in democratic integrity by WhatsApp and other 
media companies, give Malaysia a chance 
to become a model for how a historically 
restricted press may one day thrive.
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